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Torts
Torts; privacy and publicity rights
Civil Code §990 (new); §3344 (amended).
SB 613 (Campbell); 1984 STAT. Ch 1704
In 1972, the California Legislature recognized a right of privacy' by
providing civil liability for the unauthorized use of a person's name,
photograph, or likenesss for commercial purposes.2 Chapter 1704 amends
the existing right of privacy provisions3 and, in addition, enacts new law
protecting the publicity rights of deceased personalities.'
1. The right of privacy as initially advocated by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis,
branched into four distinct categories with a common denominator: each represents an interference
with the right of the plaintiff "to be let alone." W. PRossEaR & W. KEETON, THE LAw OF
TORTS, 851 (5th ed. 1983). See generally Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAv.
L. Ray. 193 (1890) (advocating a right of privacy). The categories are the following: (1) intrusion
into a person's solitude or seclusion, (2) public disclosure of private facts, (3) publicity that
places a person in a false light in the public eye, and (4) appropriation of a person's name
or image for another's benefit. Comment, Commercial Appropriation of an Individual's Name,
Photograph or Likeness: A New Remedy for Californians, 3 PAC. L.J. 651, 655-56 (1972).
Most statutory law in the United States relating to the right of privacy is directed to protecting
the fourth interest. Id. at 656. The 1972 California legislation was directed to the average citizen
whose name is used without consent to endorse or promote a particular product or service.
Id. at 664. See also Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 843 n.23, 603 P.2d 425,
443 n.23, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323, 341 n.23 (1979) (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
2. CAL. CiV. CODE §3344.
3. Compare id. §3344(a) with 1971 Cal. Stat. c. 1595, §1, at 3426.
4. The right of publicity is a variant of the category of right of privacy that protects
against appropriation of name or image for another's benefit. Comment, supra note 1, at 656.
The development of publicity rights is largely a result of the inadequacies of the privacy theory,
which is based on injury to the plaintiff's feeling, in protecting the pecuniary value of the
identities of well known personalities. Comment, Lugosi v. Universal Pictures: Descent of the
Right of Publicity, 29 HASTNGS L.J. 751, 754-55 (1978). Cf. Haelen Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps
Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 867-68 (2d Cir. 1953) (coining phrase "right of publicity";
prominent persons not injured by public exposure of their likenesses, but rather injured by
no exposure); Smith v. National Broadcasting Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 807, 812, 292 P.2d 600,
605 (1956) (person who intentionally places self in public eye loses protection of right of privacy
doctrine).
5. CAL. CIV. CODE §990. Deceased personality is defined as any natural person whose
name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness has commercial value at the time of the person's
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Right of Privacy
Existing law provides a civil penalty for the knowing use of any
person's name, photograph,6 or likeness for advertising or soliciting
purchases of products, merchandise, goods, or services without that
person's prior consent.7 Chapter 1704 expands existing law to include
the use of a person's voice or signature, uses on or in products,
merchandise or goods, and uses for the purpose of selling products,
merchandise, goods, or services.' Liability under prior law was in an
amount not less than $300.1 Chapter 1704 increases the damages
recoverable to $750 or actual damages, whichever is greater, plus any
profits not included in the actual amount resulting from the
unauthorized use.'" In addition, Chapter 1704 allows for the award
of punitive damages and entitles the prevailing party to attorney's
fees and costs."
Right of Publicity
In 1979, the California Supreme Court, in Lugosi v. Universal
death, whether or not the right to exploit that value was exercised during the personality's
lifetime. Id. §990(h). Many courts have attempted to limit the boundaries of the right of publicity
by requiring the commercial exploitation of identity during a public figure's lifetime in order
for the right to be survivable. See Comment, An Assessment of the Commercial Exploitation
Requirement as a Limitation on the Right of Publicity, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1703, 1708-09 (1983).
The Lugosi decision indicated that if Lugosi had used his identity in connection with a business
enterprise, he would have created a tangible property interest which would have survived his
death. Id. at 1708, n.32. See also 4 B. WVn'i, SulnuARY OF CALrFoRNuA LAW, Torts §342A
(1984 Supp.); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (right of
publicity survives death only if decedent commercially exploited name and likeness during life),
But see Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (not necessary
to exercise right of publicity during lifetime to protect it or preserve potential rights of heirs).
Chapter 1704 does not require that the right be exercised during the life of the personality
in order for the right to survive. See CAL. Crv. CODE §990(a), (b), (c), (h).
6. Existing law defines photograph as any photograph or photographic reproduction, still
or moving, any videotape or live television transmission of any person, such that the person
is readily identifiable. CAL. Cirv. CODE §3344(b). A person is readily identifiable when a person
viewing the photograph with the naked eye can reasonably determine who the person depicted
in the photograph is. Id. §3344(b)(1). See id. §3344(b)(2) (group photographs).
7. Id. §3344(a). Privacy statutes in other states commonly require that consent must be
in writing to be valid, but in California the consent only needs to be prior to the use, and
may be implied in some cases. Comment, supra note I, at 668.
8. Compare CA. CIV. CODE §3344(a) with 1971 Cal. Stat. c. 1595, §1, at 3426 (enacting
CAL. CIV. CODE §3344(a)).
9. 1971 Cal. Stat. c. 1595, §1, at 3426 (enacting CAL. Civ. CODE §§3344(a)).
10. Compare CAL. CiV. CODE §3344(a) with 1971 Cal. Stat. c. 1595, §1, at 3426 (enacting
CAL. Civ. CODE §3344(a)). In order to establish profits, the complainant is required only to
prove gross revenue attributable to the use, and the defendant then must prove deductable
expenses. CAL. Crv. CODE §3344(a).
11. CAL. CIV. CODE §3344(a). Punitive damages previously have been allowed in privacy
cases upon a finding that the defendant acted with fraud, express or implied malice, or oppression.
Comment, supra note 1, at 662.
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Pictures,I" held that the right of an artist or entertainer to exploit
name and likeness was a right of privacy, personal to the artist, and
not capable of descent or transfer to others after death. 3 Chapter
1704, in contrast, creates civil liability'4 for the unauthorized use'
of a deceased personality's name, voice, signature, photograph," or
likeness (hereinafter referred to collectively as identity) on or in
products, merchandise, or goods, or for advertising, selling, or
soliciting the purchase of products, goods, merchandise, or services.' 7
The rights created by Chapter 1704 are specifically designated as
property rights, freely transferrable by contract, trust, or testamentary
document, and are capable of being exercised or transferred before
death by the personality or transferees of the right, or after death
by persons named by Chapter 1704 as intestate successors or their
transferees. 8 Furthermore, Chapter 1704 specifies that the publicity
rights expire fifty years after the death of the personality.19
12. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
13. Id. at 821, 603 P.2d at 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 327. The court stated that the "right
of value" that Lugosi had in the exploifation of his name was embraced in the law of privacy,
and referred to the statutory privacy rights found in CAL. CIV. CODE §3344. 25 Cal. 3d at
818 & n.6, 603 P.2d at 428 & n.6, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326 & n.6. Chief Justice Bird, in a
dissenting opinion, stated that the majority erred in basing the decision on the existing law,
which was not intended to apply to the right of a public figure to control and profit from
the exploitation of name and likeness. Id. at 843, 603 P.2d at 444, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 341.
Lugosi was closely followed by Guglielmi v. Spelling Goldberg Productions, in which the
California Supreme Court specifically addressed the right of publicity, but relied on Lugosi
in holding that the right of publicity is not descendible. 25 Cal. 3d 860, 861, 603 P.2d 454,
455, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352, 353 (1979).
14. Liability is in the amount of $750 or actual damages, whichever is greater, plus any
profits not computed as actual damages. Id. §990(a). See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
15. The right of publicity action does not require a knowing use, as the right of privacy
action does. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE §990(a) with id. §3344(a). Although the first amendment
of the United States Constitution requires knowledge in many forms of publication, the knowledge
requirement may not be necessary in a purely commercial appropriation statute. Comment,
supra note 1, at 659. The United States Supreme Court, in Time, Inc. v. Hill, however, was
equivocal on the subject of commercial appropriation: "[A]pplication of that limited scope
would present different questions of violation of the constitutional protections for speech and
press." 385 U.S. 374, 381 (1964).
16. The definition of photograph found in CAL. CIV. CODE §3344(b) is applied by Chapter
1704 to the publicity action. CAL. Civ. CODE §990(i), (j). See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
17. CAL. Cry. CODE §990(a). This civil action is separate from the existing right of privacy
action and instead is found under Part 3, Title 2, Chapter 1704, "Products of the Mind,"
previously covering only compositions in letters or art, inventions, or designs. See CAL. Civ.
CODE §§980-990.
18. Id. §990(b),(c). Courts and commentators have differed as to whether the publicity
right is a property right or a personal right, and whether as a property right it is survivable
or transferrable. See Comment, The Right of Privacy vs. the First Amendment: Reconciling
the Conflict Between a Proprietary Interest of the Plaintiff and the Constitutional Guarantee
of Free Speech, 27 VULL. L. Rav. 1205, 1207 n.8, 1214-1221 (1982); Comment, supra note
4, at 757-58.
19. CAL. CIV. CODE §990(g). Many objections to the descendibility of publicity rights
concerned the need for durational limits. See Comment, supra note 4, at 772; Note, Torts-
Right of Publicity-Famous Persons Right of Publicity is Descendible-The Need for a Durational
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A. Descendibility
Chapter 1704 stipulates that upon the death of the personality,
publicity rights not transferred during the life of the personality pass
to the following persons: (1) the entire interest to the surviving spouse,
if no children or grandchildren survive;20 (2) if no surviving spouse,
the entire interest to the surviving children and to the surviving children
of any deceased child of the personality,' divided on a per stirpes
basis;" (3) if the decedent is survived by a spouse and children or
grandchildren, a one-half interest to the surviving spouse and a one-
half interest divided among surviving children 3 on a per stirpes basis;"
or (4) if no surviving spouse, children or grandchildren, the entire
interest to the surviving parents of the decedent .2  The rights passing
intestate under Chapter 1704 can be exercised only by those persons
who, in the aggregate, are entitled to more than a one-half interest
in the rights.2, If the rights have not been transferred during the
deceased personality's lifetime, and no successors-in-interest survive,
the rights terminate upon the death of the personality.27
B. Registration
In order to recover damages for the unauthorized use of a deceased
personality's identity, any licensee or successor to the rights is required
by Chapter 1704 to have registered a claim of the rights with the
Secretary of State prior to the unauthorized use." The registration
consists of a verified form stating the deceased personality's name
and date of death, the basis of the claim, and the rights claimed.2 9
Limit on the Right of Publicity, 14 SETOr HALL 190, 207 (1983). Chapter 1704 parallels federal
copyright law in providing a 50-year limit. See 17 U.S.C. §302(a) (duration of copyright). Included
within the protection of Chapter 1704 are persons who die within 50 years prior to January
1, 1985. CAL. CIV. CODE §990(h).
20. CAL. Crv. CODE §990(d)(1).
21. Id. §990(d)(2).
22. Id. §990(d)(4); see CAL. PROB. CODE §240 (definition of per stirpes).
23. CAL. CIV. CODE §990(d)(1), (2).
24. Id. §990(d)(4). See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
25. Id. §990(d)(3).
26. Id. §990(d). Those persons may exercise the rights on behalf of and for the benefit
of all the successors-in-interest named in section 990(d)(l)-(4). Id.
27. Id. §990(e).
28. Id. §990(f)(1), (2). The registration fee is $10. Id. §990(0(2). Previous opposition to
the survivability of publicity rights raised the question of the undue burden of seeking out
all possible successors-in-interest before using the identity with impunity. Comment, supra
note 4, at 772. The requirement of registration for publicity rights parallels federal copyright
law. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE §990(0 with 17 U.S.C. §302(d).
29. CAL. CIV. CODE §990(0(2). Chapter 1704 allows microfilming or other reproduction
of the original document and subsequent destruction of the original document by the Secretary
of State, and provides that the reproduction of the document is admissible in a court of law.
Id. §990(0(3). All reproductions may be destroyed by the Secretary of State 50 years after
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C. Exemptions
Chapter 1704 provides a number of exemptions from liability for
the unauthorized use of a deceased personality's identity." Consent
is not required for use of an identity in connection with news, public
affairs or sports broadcasts, or political campaigns.' Chapter 1704
also specifies that use of a personality's identity in a commercially
sponsored medium presents a question of fact as to whether the use
of the identity is so closely connected with the commercial aspects
of the medium as to require consent.3 2 Moreover, owners or employers
of a medium through which the advertising reaches the public 3 are
not subject to liability unless they had knowledge of the unauthorized
use. 4 Finally, Chapter 1704 specifically exempts any use of a deceased
personality's identity in (1) books, plays, magazines, newspapers,
musical compositions, films, and radio or television programs that are
not advertisements or commercial announcements;35 (2) material that
is of political or newsworthy value;3  (3) single and original works
of fine art;37 and (4) advertisements or commercial announcements
the death of the personality. Id. In addition, the claims registered under Chapter 1704 are
deemed public records, allowing their disclosure to the general public. Id., §990(f)(4). See generally
id. §1798 (Information Practices Act of 1977).
30. See id. §990(j),(k),(),(n).
31. Id. §9900). Political uses would include the unauthorized use of a person's name for
endorsing a particular candidate. Comment, supra note 1, at 667.
32. CAL. CIV. CODE §990(k). One commentator notes that commercial appropriations of
name or likeness are rarely for the sole purpose of advancing sales, but often are mixed with
a biographical or informational function, a mixture that raises problems of the violation of
first amendment rights. Comment, supra note 18, at 1234. The latitude given to the jury in
regard to the question of fact provided by Chapter 1704 may hinder the development of concrete
standards of what is and is not "directly connected" to advertising or commercial sponsorship.
Comment, suprq note 1, at 666.
33. Advertising media includes, but is not limited to, newspapers, magazines, radio and
television networks and stations, cable television systems, billboards, and transit advertisements.
CAL. CIV. CODE §§990(l), 3344(0.
34. Id. §990(1).
35. Id. §990(n)(1). "Books and movies are vehicles through which ideas and opinions are
disseminated and, as such, have enjoyed certain Constitutional protections not generally accorded
'merchandise'." Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See
also Comment, supra note 18, at 1225 n.107 (entertainment materials having first amendment
protection include fiction, biography, history, mimicry, parody, and stage, motion picture and
television productions); id. at 1229-32 (entertainment materials and free speech doctrines in
general).
36. CAL. Crv. CODE §990(n)(2). Newsworthy or political uses receive constitutional protection,
but case law varies widely as to the line between those uses and purely commercial use. See
Comment, supra note 18, at 1226-29.
37. CAL. Crv. CODE §990(n)(3). First amendment protection may apply to any nondefamatory
communication which expands the cultural experience of society by producing entertaining,
creative, or even whimsical expression. Comment, supra note 18, at 1224. In addition, California
law provides considerable protection to the "moral rights" of artists, in the form of the California
Art Preservation Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §987. See Karlen, Moral Rights in California, 19 SA
DiEGo L. REv. 675, 679 (1980).
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for a use in any of these exempted materials.3"
Conclusion
With the enactment of Chapter 1704, the California Legislature
changes prior case law that denied recognized personalities a descendible
and transferrable property right in their valuable identities. 9 In
recognizing a protectable property right and providing for descendibility
regardless of prior exercise of the right, Chapter 1704 reflects the
rationale and policy considerations of Chief Justice Rose Bird's dissent
in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures.4 Chapter 1704 also addresses specific
concerns about the creation of a descendible publicity right by
mandating termination of the right after fifty years and requiring
registration of publicity right claims with the Secretary of State.'
Although Chief Justice Bird noted in Lugosi that the sale of "plastic
toy pencil sharpeners, soap products, target games, candy dispensers
and beverage stirring rods...hardly implicates the First Amendment,' '42
many commercial products subject to the provisions of Chapter 1704
may more closely resemble protected forms of expression. 3 Chapter
1704 removes much of the potential for constitutional conflict by the
exemption of material with political, entertainment, or news value."4
Differentiation between purely commercial appropriations and the
exempted materials, however, may prove difficult, as illustrated by
cases finding news or "informational" value in such items as satirical
posters, phonograph records, games, and T-shirts. 41 Moreover, many
celebrities may be associated so closely with a political cause or ideology
that any use of their identities will represent symbolic speech protected
by the first amendment. 6 While the language of Chapter 1704 would
preclude a constitutional challenge in most of these examples, they
represent potential difficulties in the application of the law.
38. CAL. CIV. CODE §990(n)(4).
39. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text.
40. Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 828-58, 603 P.2d at 434-454, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 332-52. The
policy expressed by Chief Justice Bird in favor of the creation of a proprietary right was to
provide reward and incentive for the expenditure of time and labor needed fo produce skills
or achievements leading to public recognition, and to discourage the impairment or destruction
of the value of the identity through unauthorized appropriation. Id. at 834, 603 P.2d at 438
160 Cal. Rptr. at 336.
41. See supra notes 19 and 28 and accompanying text.
42. Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 852, 603 P.2d at 449 160 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
43. See Comment, supra note 18, at 1234.
44. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
45. Comment, supra note 18, at 1226, 1227 n.112, 1234 nn.161-62.
46. Id. at 1235 nn.163-64.
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Torts; trade secret misappropriation
Civil Code §§3426, 3426.1, 3426.2, 3426.3, 3426.4, 3426.5, 3426.6,
3426.7, 3426.8, 3426.9, 3426.10 (new); Code of Civil Procedure
§2036.2 (new).
AB 501 (Harris); 1984 STAT. Ch 1724
Chapter 1724 enacts the Uniform Trade Secrets Act' in California,
establishing a civil cause of action for misappropriation of trade
secrets.' Trade secrets historically have been protected according to
common law property or contract principles under the rules of equity
or under existing statutes relating to fair trade or labor practices.
3
Existing lav also provides criminal penalties for the theft of a trade
secret.' Chapter 1724 provides a uniform definition of terms relating
to trade secrets,5 authorizes relief for misappropriation in the form
of injunctions, 6 money damages, 7 or other types of relief,8 mandates
protection of the trade secret during litigation,9 and establishes a single
statute of limitation for trade secret misappropriation." °
I. CAL. CIV. CODE §§3426-3426.10. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (hereinafter referred
to as the Act) was promulgated in response to perceived confusion and uneven development
in trade secret law among the states. Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Commissioners' Prefatory
Note, 14 U.L.A. 537 (1980). The Act stipulates that application and construction of the provisions
of the Act should further the general purpose of making trade secret law uniform among the
states. CAL. Civ. CODE §3426.8.
2. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§3426.1-3426.10.
3. Trade secret action initiated under California Labor Code section 2860, providing that
every thing an employee acquires by virtue of his employment except compensation due belongs
to the employer, treated the trade secret as property. See California Intelligence Bureau v.
Cunningham, 83 Cal. App. 2d 197, 203, 188 P.2d 303, 306-07 (1948) (trade secrets and confidential
information are the employer's property and cannot be used by an employee for his own benefit);
Reid v. Mass Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 293, 300, 318 P.2d 54, 59 (1957) (customer list is employer's
property and use by former employee will be enjoined). Actions relying on the provisions of
the Restatement of Torts section 757, (Liability for Disclosure or Use of Another's Trade Secret)
were actions in equity to provide a remedy when there was no protected property right. 7
B. WITKIN, SUmMARY OF CAioRNuA LAW, Equity §83 (8th ed. 1974). In addition, trade secret
misappropriation often involved a breach of confidence, which led to liability under the rules
of contract law. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §757, comment j (1939). A violation of trade secret
law also could be enjoined under provisions relating to unfair competition or unfair business
practices. Chicago Lock v. Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400, 404 (9th Cir. 1982). See CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE §17200 (law governing unfair competition). The provisions relating to trade secrets were
omitted from the Second Restatement; the resulting gap in the law was filled by the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act in 1979. 7 B. WncsN, Summary of California Law, Equity §82 (8th ed.
1984 Supp.).
4. See CAL. PENAL CODE §499c.
5. CAL. CIV. CODE §3426.1.
6. Id. §3426.2(a),(b).
7. Id. §3426.3(a).
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Misappropriation
Chapter 1724 defines a trade secret as information that gains
independent economic value from being generally unknown to the
public or to others in the trade, and has been the subject of reasonable
efforts to maintain the secrecy of the information." Under Chapter
1724, misappropriation includes both the acquisition of a trade secret
by a person 2 who knows or should know that the trade secret was
acquired by improper means,' 3 and the disclsoure or use of a trade
secret without consent by a person who (1) used improper means to
acquire it," (2) knew or should have known that it was acquired by
another through improper means"s or under circumstances indicating
a duty to maintain secrecy,' 6 or (3) knew or should have known that
it was a trade secret acquired by accident or mistake.'"
11. Id. §3426.1(d). Prior to the enactment of Chapter 1724, California courts generally
used the definition of trade secret that appears in section 757, comment b of the Restatement
of Torts. See, e.g., Rigging Int'l Maintenance Co. v. Gwin, 128 Cal. App. 3d 594, 606, 180
Cal. Rptr. 451, 458 (1982); Sinclair v. Aquarius, 42 Cal. App. 3d 216, 221, 116 Cal. Rptr.
654, 658 (1974); Uribe v. Howie, 19 Cal. App. 3d 194, 208, 96 Cal. Rptr. 493, 501 (1971).
The Restatement required that a trade secret be continually in use in one's business, whereas
Chapter 1724 protects a plaintiff who has not yet had an opportunity or the means to put
the trade secret to use. Uniform Trade Secrets Act, §1, commissioners comment, 14 U.L.A.
537, 543 (1980). Unlike patent law, which provides a legal monopoly for 17 years while allowing
public disclosure, trade secret law protects commercially valuable information only as long as
it retains the element of secrecy. Comment, Trade Secrets: How Long Should an Injunction
Last?, 26 UCLA L. REv. 203, 203 (1978). The information need not be known to the general
public for trade secret rights to be lost. If the information is known within the industry or
to the principal person who can benefit from it, there is no trade secret. Uniform Trade Secrets
Act, §1, commissioners comment, 14 U.L.A. 537, 543 (1980). Similarly, information readily
available in trade journals, reference books or published materials cannot be protected as trade
secrets. Id.
12. Person is defined as a natural person, corporation, business trust, estate, trust,
partnership, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision or agency, or
any other legal or commercial entity. CAL. Civ. CODE §3426.1(c).
13. Id. §3426.1(b)(1). Chapter 1724 defines improper means to include theft, bribery,
misrepresentation, breach or inducement of a breach of duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage
through electronic or other means. Id. §3426.1(a). Compare id. with RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§757, comment f, at 10 (1939) (defining improper means as means which fall below the generally
accepted standards of commercial morality and reasonable conduct). Improper means may include
lawful conduct that is improper under the circumstances. Uniform Trade Secrets Act, §1,
commissioners comment, 14 U.L.A. 537, 542 (1980). Improper means do not include independent
derivation or reverse engineering, a process of starting with the known product and working
backward to derive the process that aided in its development or manufacture. CAL. CIV. CODE
§3426.1(a). See 7 B. WiTKIN, SuTmsARY OF CAL FoRNIA LAw, Equity §83 (8th ed. 1974)
(independent invention, accidental disclosure, or reverse engineering are not improper means).
Improper means is the basis of trade secret liability, not mere copying or use. Chicago Lock
v. Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400, 404 (9th Cir.1982).
14. CAL. CIV. CODE §3426.1(b)(2)(A).
15. Id. §3426.1(b)(2)(B)(i).
16. Id. §3426.1(b)(2)(B)(ii),(iii).
17. Id. §3426.1(b)(2)(C). The type of accident or mistake constituting misappropriation
under Chapter 1724 requires that the person seeking relief has made reasonable efforts to maintain
secrecy. Uniform Trade Secrets Act, §1, commissioners comment, 14 U.L.A. 537, 542-43 (1980).
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Injunctive Relief
With the enactment of Chapter 1724, a complainant proving actual
or threatened misappropriation of a trade secret may obtain an
injunction,'" terminable when the trade secret no longer exists, or
continued for an additional period of time to nullify any commercial
advantage gained by the misappropriation.' 9 If an injunction against
future use appears unreasonable,"0 Chapter 1724 allows the court .to
order the payment of a reasonable royalty for as long as the use could
be prohibited. 2' In some circumstances, a court order may be issued
compelling affirmative acts to protect a trade secret.
2
Damages
Chapter 1724 also permits an award of damages for actual loss
caused by the misappropriation, 3 plus recovery for unjust enrichment
18. For an injunction against threatened misappropriation, plaintiff must show a probability
of improper disclosure. S. OPPEN Imi, G. WESToN, P.MAGGS & R. SCHECHTER, UNFAIR TRADE
PRACTICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION, CASES AND COMMENTS, at 316-17 (4th ed. 1983). The
circumstances surrounding the hiring or leaving of an employee have been found to indicate
a sufficient threat of disclosure or use. Id. at 317. See also B.F. Goodrich v. Wohlgemuth,
192 N.E. 2d 99, 104-05 (Ohio Ct. App. 1963) (injunction granted on basis of attitude displayed
in termination interview); E.I. DuPont de Nemours v. American Potash and Chemical Corp.,
200 A.2d 428, 436 (Del. Ch. 1964) (disclosure of trade secret by 12-year employee inevitable
if allowed to work for only competitor using the same process).
19. CAL. CIV. CODE §3426.2(a). Trade secrets, unlike other forms of intellectual property,
which possess statutorily fixed terms, are of unpredictable duration, because the law protects
them only as long as they remain secret. Comment, supra note 11, at 203. When a trade secret
has been disclosed before trial, a split of authority has existed as to whether an injunction
should be perpetual or should issue at all. Id. at 206-07. Compare Shellmar Products Co. v.
Allen-Qualley Co., 87 F.2d 104, 108 (7th Cir. 1936) (majority view that appropriate remedy
for trade secret theft is perpetual injunction) with Conmar Products Corp. v. Universal Slide
Fastener Co., 172 F.2d 150, 156 (2d Cir. 1949) (injunction must end when secrecy ends). The
modern trend is to issue a limited injunction for the approximate period a competitor would
require to legitimately produce a copy after public disclosure of the secret. Comment, supra
note 11, at 215-16. See Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co.,
350 F.2d 134, 142 (9th Cir. 1965).
20. Prohibition of future use may be deemed unreasonable in light of an overriding public
interest in the denial of an injunction, or in the case of reasonable reliance in good faith upon
the acquisition of a misappropriated trade secret. Uniform Trade Secrets Act, §2, commissioners
comment, 14 U.L.A. 537, 545 (1980).
21. CAL. CIV. CODE §3426.2(b). See also supra note 20 and accompanying text (duration
of prohibition).
22. CAL. CIV. CODE §3426.2(c). Affirmative acts may include a return of the fruits of
the misappropriation to the plaintiff. Uniform Trade Secrets Act, §2, commissioners comment,
14 U.L.A. 537, 546 (1980).
23. California courts have disagreed as to the proper circumstances for an award of damages
and the proper measure of damages. See, e.g., Gordon v. Landau, 49 Cal. 2d 690, 695, 321
P.2d 456, 459 (1958) (damages awarded only when expiration of agreement precluded injunction);
Reid v. Mass Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 293, 307, 318 P.2d 54, 68 (1957) (damages may be properly
measured by plaintiff's lost profits); American Loan Corp. v. California Commercial Corp.,
211 Cal. App. 2d 515, 524, 27 Cal. Rptr. 243, 248 (1963) (damages measured by profits gained
by defendant). The amount of damages often is highly speculative due to the difficulty of
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not computed into the actual 1oss.24 If neither actual loss nor unjust
enrichment can be proved, the court may order payment of a
reasonable royalty for no longer than the use could have been
prohibited. 5 If the misappropriation is willful and malicious, the court
may award punitive damages up to twice the amount of actual damages
awarded.26 In addition, Chapter 1724 allows for an award of reasonable
attorney's fees if willful and malicious misappropriation exists, if a
claim of misappropriation is made in bad faith, or if a motion to
terminate an injunction is made or resisted in bad faith.2"
Protection During Litigation
Chapter 1724 requires a court to use reasonable means to preserve
the secrecy of a trade secret during the course of the action, including
protective orders during discovery, in camera hearings, sealing of
records, and ordering persons involved in the litigation not to reveal
the secret without prior court approval. 8 The party alleging a
misappropriation, however, is required by Chapter 1724 to identify
the trade secret with reasonable particularity before initiating
discovery.29
Statute of Limitation
Prior to the enactment of Chaper 1724, the statute of limitation
for trade secret litigation varied depending on the legal basis of the
action.30 Chapter 1724 specifies that the statute of limitation for any
action for misappropriation is three years from the time the
misappropriation is discovered or should have been discovered by
reasonable diligence. 3' The provisions of Chapter 1724 do not supersede
any statute relating to the misappropriation or regulation of trade
estimating either lost profits or wrongful gains. Comment, supra note 11, at 203.




28. Id. §3426.5. See S. OrEaEwtm , G. WESTON, P. MAGS & R. SCHECHTER, UNFAIR TRADE
PRACTICES AND CONSUMER PRACTas, CASES AND COMMENTS, at 317 (4th ed. 1983) (protection
of trade secret in court).
29. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE §2036.2.
30. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
31. CAL. Crv. CODE §3426.6. Under Chapter 1724, a continuing misappropriation constitutes
a single claim. Id. Although prior to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, a conflict existed among
other states as to whether a misappropriation constituted a continuous wrong, California regarded
a misappropriation as a single wrong, with the statute of limitation running from the initial
misappropriation. Uniform Trade Secrets Act, §6, commissioners comment, 14 U.L.A. 537,
549 (1980).
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secrets.32 Moreover, the title has no effect on any contractual or
criminal remedies,33 on other civil remedies not based on trade secret
misappropriation,34 or on the disclosure of a public record by a state
or local agency under the California Public Records Act.1
5
32. CAL. Civ. CODE §3426.7(a). See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§16606 (customer list of
telephone answering service is a trade secret), 16607 (customer list of employment agency is
a trade secret). Federal patent law does not preempt state action to protect trade secrets even
if they are patentable. 7 B. WrrKN, SUmARY OF CALn~oR'IA LAW, Equity §82 (8th ed. 1974)
(citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 478 (1974).
33. A duty of secrecy that is voluntarily assumed through express or implied-in-fact contract
is governed by contract law. Uniform Trade Secrets Act, §7, commissioner's comment, 14 U.L.A.
537, 550 (1980). A trade secret agreement, or confidential disclosure of a secret in return for
royalties, is effective only between the contracting parties and is not a bar to free copying
by others who discover the idea independently. 7 B. WrrKiN, SummARY OF CALiFoRitA LAW,
Equity §84A (8th ed. 1984 supp.) (citing Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 482). Criminal penalties
for trade secret misappropriation are imposed by California Penal Code section 499c.
34. CA. CIV. CODE §3426.7(b).
35. Id. §3426.7(c). The California Public Records Act, sections 6250-6265 of the Government
Code, permits public access to public records. Exemption of particular records from the disclosure
requirements are found in section 6254 of the Government Code, which may operate to exempt
records containing trade secrets when it will not tend to conceal fraud or otherwise work injustice.
Uribe v. Howie, 19 Cal. App. 3d, 194, 206-07, 96 Cal. Rptr. 493, 499-500 (1971). See generally,
id. (pesticide spray reports did not constitute trade secret and could not be deemed privileged
under exemptions of the California Governmental Code); California School Empl. Ass'n v.
Sunnyvale Elementary School Dist. of Santa Clara County, 36 Cal. App. 3d 46, 66, 111 Cal.
Rptr. 433, 445 (1973) (Government Code exception in favor of privileged material is broad
enough to cover trade secrets). The provisions of Chapter 1724 are severable in order to ensure
that if any provision is held invalid, the remaining provisions that can be given effect without
the invalid provisions will remain in effect. CAL. CIV. CODE §3426.10.
Torts; discrimination-sexual orientation
Civil Code §51.7 (amended).
AB 848 (Bates); 1984 STAT. Ch 1437
The Ralph Civil Rights Act of 19761 provides that all persons within
California have the right to be free from violence or intimidation by
threat of violence against their person or property based upon race,
color, religion, ancestry, national origin, political affiliation, sex, or
position in a labor dispute. 2 In an apparent attempt to protect those
individuals who are victimized due to a presumed infirmity,
3
1. CAL. Crv. CODE §51.7. See 1976 Cal. Stat. c. 1293, §1, at 5778 (short title).
2. CAL. CIV. CODE §51.7; see also id. §52. Any person who denies another individual
the right to freedom from violence will be liable to the injured person for the actual damages
of each and every offense, and $10,000 in addition thereto. Id.
3. See San Francisco Chronicle, Aug. 29, 1984, at 1, col. 5.
Selected 1984 California Legislation
Torts
incompetence,' or inability to obtain civil protection, Chapter 1437
expands the protected classifications to include sexual orientation, age,
and disability.' Sexual orientation is defined by Chapter 1437 as
heterosexuality, homosexuality, or bisexuality.
6
4. See Note, Derivative Deviance... The Cases of Extortion, Fag-Bashing, and Shakedown
of Gay Men, 19 CRIMNOLoGY 546, 547 (Feb. 1982).
5. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE §51.7(a) with 1976 Cal. Stat. c. 1293, §2, at 5778 (enacting
CAL. Crv. CODE §51.7).
6. CAL. CIV. CODE §51.7(b).
Torts; dog bites
Penal Code §399.5 (new); Civil Code §3342.5 (amended).
AB 2208 (Tucker); 1984 STAT. Ch 655
(Effective August 15, 1984)
Existing law provides that after a dog has bitten a human being
on two separate occasions, a civil action may be brought against the
owner of the animal by any individual, the district attorney, or the
city attorney to determine whether conditions or circumstances existing
at the time of the bites have changed so as to remove the danger
to other persons.' Chapter 655 provides that a civil action may be
brought against the owner after one bite if the dog is trained to fight,
attack, or kill, and the attack causes substantial physical injury.-
In addition to providing a civil remedy, Chapter 655 provides
misdemeanor penalties for an owner or person having custody or
control' of a dog trained to fight, attack, or kill if, as a result of
the owner's failure to exercise ordinary care, the dog bites a human
being on two occasions or on one occasion causing substantial physical
injury." The owner or custodian will not be criminally liable under
1. CAL. CIv. CODE §3342.5(b). See also id. §3344.5(a) (imposing legal duty on the owner
of any dog that has bitten a human being to take reasonable precautions necessary to remove
any danger presented to other persons from bites by the animal). The action may be brought
in the municipal court in the county where the bite occurred. Id. §3342.5(b).
2. Id. §3342.5(c). The court, after a hearing, may make any order it deems appropriate
to prevent the recurrence of such an incident, including, but not limited to, removal from
the area or destruction of the animal. Id.
3. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §399.5(a) with CAL. CIV. CODE §3342.5 (civil action
applicable only to dog owners).
4. CAL. PENAL CODE §399.5(a). A violation of this section is punishable by up to six
months in county jail, a $1,000 fine, or both. Id. Chapter 655 has no effect on the liability
of a dog owner under CAL. PENAL CODE §399, which imposes felony penalties upon the owner
of a mischievous animal that kills a person. Id. §399.5(d).
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Chapter 655, however, unless the owner or custodian knew or should
have known of the vicious or dangerous character of the dog, or if
the victim failed to take all precautions that a reasonable person would
ordinarily take in the same situation.5 Following an individual's
conviction of violating Chapter 655, a court hearing is required' to
determine if the dog continues to present a danger to other persons,
and to authorize appropriate action, including removal or destruction
of the dog.'
Chapter 655 does not authorize either a civil or criminal action based
on a bite or bites inflicted upon a trespasser or inflicted by a military
or police dog while the dog is actually performing in that capacity.7
Moreover, a misdemeanor action is not authorized by Chapter 655
when the victim has provoked', the dog or contributed to the injury.9
5. Id. §399.5(a). See generally Gomes v. Byrne, 51 Cal. 2d 418, 333 P.2d 754 (1959);
Smythe v. Schacht, 93 Cal. App. 2d 315, 209 P.2d 114 (1949) (cases illustrating reasonable
precaution and assumption of the risk with regard to dog bites).
6. CAL. PENAL CODE §399.5(b).
7. CAL. CrV. CODE §3342.5(d); CAL. PENAL CODE §399.5(c).
8. Provocation includes, but is not limited to, approaching the owner or custodian in
a threatening manner, thereby causing a dog held on a leash to react in a protective manner.
CAL. PENAL CODE §399.5(c).
9. Id.
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